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ABSTRACT
Management accounting theories claim that firms experience different risks during different stages of a product’s lifecycle. 
This study examines the moderating role of corporate governance on the relationship between a firm’s product lifecycle 
and its risk- taking aspects. The study was conducted from 2006 to 2014 in the Tehran Stock Exchange. We conducted 
a statistical panel data analysis and the sample consisted of 128 firms (1,152 firm-year observations). The results 
showed that the decline stage of the product life cycle is the only stage that would affect the risk-taking of the selected 
firms. Conceivably, there is a positive relationship between the decline stage of the product lifecycle and risk-taking. In 
addition, the results indicate a positive relationship between the growth and decline stages of a firm’s product lifecycle 
and its risk-taking when corporate governance plays a moderating role. In short, when corporate governance acts as a 
moderating variable, the relationship between a firm’s product lifecycle and its risk-taking is lower than the time when 
there is no such variable. Hence, regulators and managers should consider the role of corporate governance in all the 
stages of a product’s lifecycle to ensure successful firm decisions and strategies.
Keywords: Risk-taking; product lifecycle; corporate governance; agency theory.
INTRODUCTION
Emergence of literature on product life cycle (Al-Hadi, 
Hasan & Habib 2015; Habib & Hassan 2015; Rahimi & 
Fallah 2015) has unambiguously pointed out towards the 
significance of delineating a firm’s risk throughout the 
product lifecycle. Life cycling of products involves the 
introduction, growth, maturity, decline, and shake-out 
stages (Gort & Klepper 1982). In effect, it has given 
rise to the following question: What is the significant 
effect of each stage of a product’s lifecycle on the firm’s 
risk-taking? 
 Meanwhile, corporate governance literature (Jensen 
& Meckling 1976; Lee, Kim & Kim 2016; Paminto 2015; 
Shleifer & Vishny 1986) reveals that the implementation 
of suitable corporate governance would enhance the firms’ 
economic efficiency and growth. Hence, strong corporate 
governance could reduce the firm’s risks in various 
domains. It eliminates or reduces the risk of conflicts of 
interests among the stakeholders of a firm, particularly 
the agency relationship between the management and 
stockholders (Namazi 1985 & 2013). The structure of 
corporate governance also unequivocally determines 
the rights and obligations of different stakeholders in 
the organization i.e. management, board members, 
shareholders, and other individuals. If the corporate 
governance mechanisms are effectively designed, the 
firm is expected to be effective in the decision- making 
process (Fung 2014). The improved decision -making 
process of the corporate governance mechanisms may 
also resulted in reduced risks (Lee, Kim & Kim 2016). 
Since important decisions related to the products, have to 
made by the firm, including- whether to maintain existing 
products or abandon some current products and introduce 
new ones- a strong corporate governance can significantly 
affect the relation between the product life- cycling 
process of the firm and its risks. Filatotchev, Toms and 
Wright (2006) suggest that governance issues should go 
beyond economic and financial perspectives to embrace 
product strategy and knowledge dimensions as well as 
contexture issues (Filatotchev et al. 2006: 257). They 
reveal that the corporate governance parameters might 
be linked to the strategic thresholds in the firm’s product 
lifecycle and that successful transition over a threshold 
is accompanied by rebalancing the structure and roles of 
corporate governance at each stage of the lifecycle. In 
short, the key issues here is: Does corporate governance 
strengthen the relationship between each stage of the 
product lifecycle and the firm’s risks? 
 The goal of this article is to respond to the preceding 
inquiries by examining the relationship between a 
firm’s product lifecycle and its risks, and investigate 
the moderating role of corporate governance in the 
relationship. Despite various attempts of considering, the 
role of corporate governance in this sphere has not yet been 
investigated. A contemporary issue that has been studied 
recently is the effect of a firm’s product life cycling in its 
risk- taking projects. Habib and Hasan (2015) maintain 
that corporate risk-taking is accompanied by the changes 
in the stages of a firm’s product lifecycle. For instance, a 
firm’s financial resource bases are more substantial, and 
require more risky investment for expansion during the 
early phase of a firm’s product lifecycle. However, during 
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the decline stage, increased risk-taking is influenced by 
the firm’s aim to return to profitability. Thus, this article 
contributes by extending the previous studies. It argues 
that changes in a firm’s product lifecycle, will affect 
its risk-taking when corporate governance operates as 
a moderating variable. The empirical evidence of the 
study also indicates that there is a link between corporate 
governance and the firm’s performance at various stages 
of its product lifecycle and risk-taking. 
 The rest of the article is structured as follows: Section 
2 describes the theory. Section 3 reviews the literature and 
describes the development of the hypothesis. Section 4 
presents the data and the adopted methodology. Section 5 
delineates the results, and Section 6 provides a discussion 
and conclusion of the study.
THEORETICAL BASIS
A firm’s risk-taking refers to the amount of uncertainty 
associated with the expected outcomes and cash flows as 
a result of investments in new projects (Habib & Hasan 
2015; Wright, Ferrris & Awasthi 1996). It can provide 
some idea about the firm’s growth, performance, and 
survival (Bromiley 1991; Habib & Hasan 2015; Lee, 
Kim & Kim 2016). According to the agency theory 
(Namazi 1985; Ross 1973), shareholders prefer of the 
firms implement positive net present value projects 
regardless of their associated risks (Faccio, Marchica & 
Mura 2011). However, managers are primarily influenced 
by their behavior of the self-interest and are reluctant 
towards undertaking risky projects (Fama 1980), and 
are likely to maintain the risk to the resulting significant 
investments (Parrino, Poteshman & Weisbach 2005). In 
these situations, when the firms maintain an excessive 
free cash -flows, growth- maximizing managements 
will tend to invest in projects where the yield is lower 
than the firm’s cost of capital (Jensen 1986). Any firm 
earning significant free cash flows is likely to overinvest 
in negative net present value projects (Saravia 2013).
 Low (2009) reveals that the managers with more 
sustained positions will reduce their risk- taking behavior. 
Consequently, two potential obstacles may arise such 
as: an agency problem and a risk- sharing problem 
(Emenyi 2013). An agency problem appears when the 
management’s goals differ from those of the principals 
(i.e. moral hazard). This problem also arises when it is 
difficult or expensive to verify that the managements 
possesses the expertise and skills to perform the delegated 
tasks (i.e. adverse selection) that they claim to possess. A 
risk-sharing problem arises when the principals and the 
agents have different attitudes towards risk, and, hence, 
disagreements develop about the actions that should 
be undertaken (Namazi 1985; 2013; Ross 1973: 136). 
For these problems, the agency theory proposes two 
formal types of management mechanisms to monitor the 
relationships (Rungtusanatham, Rabinovich, Ashenbaum 
& Wallin 2007: 118). One is the outcome-based 
management mechanism, in which both the principals 
and the agents can jointly observe the outcome, and 
the reward of the agents is based on some observable 
measured performance (Ekanayake 2004; Choi & Liker 
1995). The other management mechanism is behavior-
based, in which the principals can establish the behavior 
controls to monitor the behaviors and efforts of the agents 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Ekanayake 2004; Emenyi 2013).
 Risk-taking can be influenced by agency problems. 
Two hypotheses for this issue are offered. The first one 
is the wealth transfer hypothesis (Cummins & Sommers 
1996) that argues that the position of the equity holders 
is similar to a call option, and the value of this call option 
is determined by increasing the risk of the related assets. 
It suggests that as the manager’s ownership increases 
his or her interests would become more compatible with 
the interests of the shareholders. This phenomenon will 
create a strong incentive to maximize the value of their 
call options because of adopting a higher level of risk 
(Galai & Masulis 1976; Chen, Steiner & White 2001).
 The second hypothesis is the risk aversion hypothesis 
(Smith & Stulz 1985) that asserts that as the ownership 
shares of the managers increase, they become increasingly 
risk- averse and are more prone to risks (Chen et al. 2001). 
This risk aversion attitude may guide them to select less 
risky investments or to operate with larger amounts of 
capital than what stockholders would define as optimal 
(García-Marco & Robles-Fernández 2008). These 
managers will avoid very risky strategies in an attempt 
to keep their jobs and because they will not receive 
any extra compensation for getting a higher return by 
adopting a greater risk, they have no incentive to select 
risky projects (Rasmussen 1988; Masulis 1987). But, if a 
sufficient concentration of the ownership structure exists, 
the agency problem may be attenuated and the degree 
of risk aversion among managers could be monitored 
(García-Marco & Robles-Fernández 2008).
 On the other hand, a firm’s product lifecycle theory 
(Al-Hadi et al. 2015; Habib & Hassan 2015;) involves 
describing the characteristics of introduction, growth, 
mature, decline, and shake-out stages. This theory can 
be viewed as an extension of the product lifecycle 
concept, developed in marketing (Rink & Swan 1979). 
Similar to an individual who moves through a sequence 
of distinct stages of life, the life of a firm’s product can 
also be described in terms of lifecycle stages. These 
stages depend on the portfolios of strategies, structures, 
obstacles, and processes that the product faces over 
a particular period in its life (Jaafar & Halim 2016). 
Because of the agency relations discussed earlier and 
the inherent characteristics of each life cycle, different 
amounts of risks, investments, cash flow and agency 
costs are associated with the various stages of the firm’s 
product lifecycle. In other words, the amount of risk is 
not the same for each firm’s product cycle stage; rather 
it is different at each stage. 
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PRIOR STUDIES AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
FIRM’S PRODUCT LIFECYCLE AND ITS RISK
As environmental and organizational complexities grow 
by the day, different kinds of knowledge are required to 
operate the administrative affairs of a firm effectively and 
efficiently (Filatotchev et al. 2006: 264). Consequently, 
agency and monitoring issues would grow to become 
the dominant functions of the firm. With respect to a 
product’s lifecycle, at the stage of maturity for instance- the 
monitoring function becomes dominant but establishing 
a suitable monitoring mechanism is costly. Mature firms 
may also face shortcomings in their corporate governance 
system and not adapt to the prevalent environmental 
changes (Filatotchev et al. 2006: 267-268). They may also 
miss the opportunity to undertake the superior positive net 
present value projects and maintain a substantial and free 
cash flow (Jensen 1993). These factors could also increase 
the amount of the risk and the cost of the agency. 
 A very limited number of studies have so far been 
conducted to empirically investigate the relationship 
between a firm’s product lifecycle and its risks. Lin, Chen, 
Wang and AngelaLiu (2012) revealed that in the growth 
stage, firms would tend to accept more risk. Financial 
soundness is the focus of the premise for the developing 
firms to select risky investment projects. In the growth 
stage, firms would also focus on future growth rather than 
current performance. However, for firms in the shake-out 
stage, neither its resources nor performances affect their 
risk behavior significantly. In addition, foreign direct 
investments at each stage of the firm’s lifecycle are highly 
related to the type of industry. Saravia (2013) demonstrated 
that as firms mature, the agency costs of the free cash- 
flows will also increase, more anti-takeover provisions 
will emerge, and firms will invest in projects with returns 
below their cost of capital. Al-Hadi et al. (2015) found 
that firms with a separate risk committee are associated 
with greater market risk disclosures, an effect that is more 
pronounced for the mature-stage firms. Rahimi and Fallah 
(2015) examined the lifecycle of the organizations (two 
banks) and their impact on the formulation of the strategy. 
They also outlined the peculiar characteristics required for 
the implementation of the strategy in each lifecycle. Habib 
and Hasan (2015), found that risk-taking is higher in the 
introduction and decline stages of the product lifecycle but 
lower in the growth and mature stages. They also reported 
that risk-taking during the introduction and decline stages 
adversely affects the future performance of the firm. This 
relation is positive for the growth and maturity stages. 
Habib and Hasan (2015) also reported that the manager’s 
inner risk-taking inclination would increase during the 
periods of high emotional behavior of the investors. 
However, firms at different stages of product life cycle, 
respond to emotional behavior differently. Finally, their 
results suggested that a firm’s life cycle posits explanatory 
power for a corporate organization’s risk-taking behavior. 
Hence, the following hypothesis is provided:
H1: Stages of a firm’s product lifecycle affects its risk-
taking action
The Role of Corporate Governance  The theory of the 
firm (Jensen & Meckling 1976) identifies three factors 
that can alleviate agency conflicts and also might affect 
risk- taking: management incentives, monitoring, and 
ownership structure (Eling & Marek 2014).The structure 
of the board has especially been identified as a driver of the 
firm’s risk (Pathan 2009). Although corporate governance 
is about ensuring accountability of the management to 
minimize downside shareholder risk, it is also concerned 
with enabling managerial entrepreneurship so that the 
shareholders benefit from the upside potential of the firms 
(Keasey & Wright 1993; and Filatotchev et al. 2006).
 Eling & Marek (2014) presented an empirical 
evidence on the link between corporate governance and 
risk- taking, considering insurers from two large European 
insurance markets (UK and Germany). They found that 
higher levels of compensation, increased monitoring, and 
more block-holders are associated with lower risk-taking. 
When chief executives officers (CEOs) are encouraged to 
take higher risks, they might protect themselves from the 
risk by raising the fixed component proportion of their 
pay and reducing the variable component (Aggarwal & 
Samwick 1999). Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) suggest 
that firms that desire to implement risky policies might 
select a higher sensitivity of CEO’s pay to stock return 
volatility to increase the exposure of the managers to stock 
volatility. They state that a higher sensitivity of the CEO’s 
pay to stock return volatility would lead to selecting more 
risky investments and higher equity volatility. In effect, 
shareholders encourage the CEOs to take risky investment 
decisions because risky projects create value for the firm 
and provide gains to the owners. On the other hand, the 
CEOs with no incentive packages are risk- averse because 
their compensation, reputation, job security, and career are 
associated with the firm they manage, and they cannot be 
diversified. Therefore, a risk-averse CEO prefers to run the 
firm in a static and stable way (Jafri & Trabelsi 2013).
 Jiraporn, Chatjuthamard, Tong and Kim (2015) 
maintain that weaker corporate governance imposes fewer 
restrictions on the managers. This provides managers 
more latitude in organizing corporate policies that reflect 
their attitude of risk-aversion. Their result reveals that the 
firms with more effective governance establish corporate 
strategies that are significantly less risky. Effective 
governance substantially diminishes the degree of risk-
taking.
 Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that major 
shareholders tend to lead firms towards selecting high-risk 
and high-return projects. John, Litov and Yeung (2008) 
and Laeven and Levine (2009) also empirically document 
that corporate governance affects risk-taking. A board 
with a greater number of more independent members and 
more meetings might monitor its executives more strictly. 
Stricter monitoring would limit executive discretion and 
decrease the chances of exerting excessive risk- taking. 
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This might ultimately leads to a negative relation between 
monitoring and risk -taking. 
 Even though there is no optimal board size for firms, 
the size of the board also appears to affect the value of 
the corporate’s organization (Coles, Daniel & Naveen 
2008; Uchida 2011), the firm’s policy choices, and its 
risk-taking behavior (Wang 2012). Shareholders posit 
a significant impact on the firm’s financial decisions by 
holding sizable stakes in the company. They can shape the 
nature of the firm’s corporate risk-taking, which may affect 
its ability to compete and eventually survive (Paligorova 
2010; Wright et al. 1996). Greater insider ownership is an 
effective means of aligning the interests of managers and 
shareholders. Nakano and Nguyen’s (2012) results indicate 
that firms with larger boards induce lower performance 
volatility as well as lower bankruptcy risk. The low cross-
sectional variation in risk-taking among Japanese firms is 
considered to play a role. In addition, they demonstrate 
that the effect of the board size is less significant when 
the firms maintain plenty of investment opportunities 
but it’s much stronger when the firms posit fewer growth 
options. The researchers reported that the negative effect 
of a large board should be weaker for high-growth firms 
but more severe for low-growth firms. The reason is that 
when a firm maintains a large number of projects, these 
projects can be allocated to and evaluated by smaller 
sub-groups of directors. Hence, each of these sub-groups 
is effectively evaluating the same number of projects as 
complete, but smaller, the board of a firm with fewer 
projects. In effect, a greater proportion of risky projects 
survive the screening process (Nakano & Nguyen 2012: 
370). Huang and Wang (2014) also showed that smaller 
boards are accompanied by riskier firm policy choices and, 
consequently, greater risk for the firm. Their results reveal 
that Chinese companies with more concentrated ownership 
are less likely to invest in relatively riskier research and 
development- intensive investments. The findings also 
reveals that Chinese companies with smaller boards are 
more interested in ratifying risky policy choices dovetailed 
with the shareholders’ interest. Garcia-Marco & Robles-
Fernandez (2008) studied whether the differences in risk 
behavior are related to different ownership structures or 
other constructs such as the size of the entity. They found 
that Spanish commercial banks were more risk-inclined 
than Spanish savings banks. They also reported that size 
is relevant for explaining risk-taking. In general, smaller 
institutions appear to assume lower risks.
 Other studies (Amihud, Lev & Travlos 1990; 
Bauguess, Slovin & Sushka 2012) also found that large 
equity holdings by insiders can lead to risk avoidance with 
respect to business strategies and investments, considering 
the undiversified financial and human capital of the 
insiders. As the ownership stake increases, owners maintain 
greater incentives to raise a firm’s profit by selecting risker 
projects. Concentrating much of their wealth on a single 
firm might force the major shareholders to lead business 
from a more risk- adverse situation than if they had 
diversified the portfolios of the firms (Paligorova 2010). 
The net effect of the ownership structure on risk-taking is 
less unambiguous and depends on the optimal trade-off 
between the costs and benefits of the large ownership 
interests (Paligorova 2010).
  The type of shareholders also plays a potent role 
in the sphere of a firm’s risk-taking (Anderson, Mansi 
& Reeb 2003). For instance, Saito (2008) indicates 
that a greater alignment of interest for the family firms 
affects risk-taking. Paligorova (2010) reports that family 
firms do not select risky projects as their controlling 
stake increases. They also participate in a much smaller 
degree in groups, which makes it impossible to evaluate 
the effect of the ownership structure on risk- taking in 
family-controlled groups. The results point out that they 
avoid risk-taking outside the groups. Thus, the family 
firms might avoid taking risks due to their goal of passing 
firms on the next generation (Anderson et al. 2003). The 
results of the research conducted by Nguyen’s (2011) also 
provide an economic rationale for the higher (and lower) 
performances of the family- controlled (bank-controlled 
firms, respectively). The results explain the higher 
performance of the firms with concentrated ownership 
by relating their governance structures to risk-taking. 
Finally, the study shows that the impact of the governance 
structures on risk -taking is stronger after controlling to 
avoid endogeneity. John et al. (2008) also demonstrate 
that superior investor protection leads to riskier and 
more value-enhancing investments, and strong investor 
protection is expected to be positively related to risk-
taking (Paligorova 2010). Galai and Masulis (1976) point 
out that shareholders with limited liability tend to display 
some incentive to take excessive risk to maximize the 
corporate value at the expense of bondholders. Evidence 
presented by Chen et al. (2001) demonstrated that the 
level of a life insurance company’s risk is dependent on 
the level of its managerial ownership. In particular, as the 
level of managerial ownership increases, the level of risk 
also increases; thus, it supports a wealth transfer hypothesis 
over a risk- aversion hypothesis.
 Filatotchev et al. (2006) contend that the corporate 
governance issues go beyond economic and financial 
perspectives; It encompasses strategy and knowledge 
dimensions as well as the contextual issues (Filatotchev et 
al. 2006: 257). They reveal that the corporate governance 
parameters are linked to the strategic thresholds in the 
firm’s life-cycle and a successful transition over a threshold 
is accompanied by the study of the corporate governance 
structure at each stage of the product lifecycle. 
 Although the preceding studies have enhanced 
the extent of knowledge in this domain, the effect of 
corporate governance has not yet been studied thoroughly. 
Less attention has been given to the effect of corporate 
governance and its relation to each elements of the product 
lifecycle (Filatotchev et al. 2006; O’Connor & Byrne 
2015). The corporate governance literature in the domain 
of governance to value has demonstrated a causal relation 
between corporate governance and the firm’s value and 
risk. However, there is no evidence of a causal relationship 
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exists between each stage of the firm’s product lifecycle 
and corporate governance. Hence, in this study, corporate 
governance was used as the moderating variable to 
investigate its potential impact on the relationship between 
the firm’s product life cycle and its risk.-taking behavior. 
Hence, this article extends previous research and argues 
that the changes at each of the stages tend to maintain an 
effect on the firm’s risk-taking. This relationship depends 
on the corporate governance structure and thus the structure 
plays a significant role. It provides empirical evidence on 
the links between corporate governance and risk-taking at 
various stages of the firm’s product lifecycle. Hence, the 
following hypothesis is provided:
H2: Corporate governance moderates the relationship 
between the stage of a firm’s product lifecycle and its 
risk-taking behavior.
RESEARCH METHOD
This study aims to investigate the moderating role of 
corporate governance on the relationship between a firm’s 
product lifecycle and its risk-taking, as listed in the Tehran 
Stock Exchange (TSE). Hence, this is an applied research, 
in which the research plan is based on a one-shot ex-post 
design only (Smith 2015). Figure 1 shows the conceptual 
framework of the study.
POPULATION, SAMPLING AND DATA COLLECTION
The population of this study comprises all the firms listed 
on the TSE. The TSE was selected because it is the only 
market place that lists the larger and established firms in 
Iran. It is Iran’s largest stock exchange, and a member of 
the World Federation of Exchanges. It’s also a founding 
market of the Federation of Euro-Asian Stock Exchanges 
and has been identified as an emerging market (Namazi 
& Khansalar 2011). Although, in recent years, the 
privatization law has caused the TSE firms to go through 
private ownerships, hence, most firms are still controlled 
by the public and institutional corporate ownership.
 In this study, the initial sample contained 401 firms 
(3,609 firm-years) during a nine-year sample period from 
2006-2014. However, in pursuing the aim of this research, 
the public, financial and real estate firms were excluded 
from the sample because the nature of their operations 
is different. In addition, the firms that changed their 
financial period during the research, and those without 
enough data for estimating other control variables in our 
baseline regression models were excluded from making 
the data comparable and complete. This provided us with 
128 firms (1,152 observations). Table 1 shows the sample 
selection. The data was obtained from two databases: 
www.codal.ir and www.rdis.ir. The annual reports of 
the listed companies from 2006-2010 are available on 
the www.rdis.ir and the annual reports of the companies 
from 2011-2014 are available on the www.codal.ir. All 
these annual reports are audited. The information exerted 
from the reports are elements of the cash-flow statement, 
assets, shareholders’ equity, debts, and the net incomes 
that are necessary for the calculation of the variables of 
this study.
VARIABLE MEASUREMENTS
Dependent Variable In this research, the dependent variable 
is designated as the firm’s risk-taking. Following Rajgopal 
and Shevlin (2002) and Imhof and Seavey (2014), a firm’s 
risk was measured using the standard deviation of the 
operating cash- flows for the three-year period (t-1, t , 
and t+1) (deflated by total assets). The higher the variance 
of operating cash-flows, the higher the uncertainty in the 
TABLE 1. Sample selection
Total firms in year 2014 401
Public, finance and real estate sectors firms and firms that changed 
their financial year during research period
(271)
Firms that their data were not available (2)
Total 128
FIGURE 1. Conceptual framework of this study
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expected cash-flows associated with prior investments and 
the greater the corporate risk. 
Independent Variable The independent variable of this 
research represents the firm’s lifecycle, which consists of 
the various stages such as introduction, growth, mature, 
decline, and shakeout .Assessing the lifecycle stages at 
the firm level is difficult because the firm’s operation is 
composed of many overlapping and distinct stages of 
a product’s life cycle stages (Dickinson 2011). In order 
to overcome this estimation problem, we followed the 
methodologies of Dickinson (2011) to develop proxies 
for the stage in the firms’ lifecycle, by combining 
production theory, investment, learning and experience 
and market share theory. We also developed and validated 
a parsimonious cash proxy model, based on the predicted 
behavior of three significant variables: operating, investing, 
and financing the cash- flows of the firm-across the firm’s 
lifecycle. In effect, this study substituted and validated the 
cash- flow patterns in accounting as a proxy of identifying 
the firm lifecycle. Hence, following the methodologies 
of Dickinson (2011), Suberi, Hsu and Wyatt (2011), and 
Hasan, Hossain and Habib (2015), the firm’s risk cash 
flows from operating (CFO), investing (CFI), and financing 
(CFF) were used to group firms at different stages in their 
lifecycles. The methodology was as follows:
The firm is at the introduction stage, if CFO < 0, CFI 
< 0, and CFF > 0; 
The firm is at the growth stage, if CFO > 0, CFI < 0, 
and CFF > 0; 
The firm is at the mature stage, if CFO > 0, CFI < 0, 
and CFF < 0; 
The firm is at the decline stage, if CFO < 0, CFI > 0, 
and CFF≤ or ≥0; 
And the remaining firm years are classified under the 
shake-out stage. 
 Livnat and Zarowin (1990) showed that the 
decomposition of cash flows into operating, investing, 
and financing activities differentially affects the stock 
returns (see also Khansalar & Namazi 2017). Therefore, 
cash flows capture the differences in a firm’s profitability, 
growth, and risk. The combination of the three types of 
cash flows is mapped into the lifecycle theory to derive 
the lifecycle classification, used throughout the study.
 In this study, the cash flow was calculated following 
the equation, presented in Table 2.
Moderating Variable Corporate governance was used as a 
moderating variable in this study. A moderating variable 
refers to a qualitative or quantitative variable that affects 
the strength and/or the direction of the relationship 
between the criterion variables and the predictor variables 
(Baron & Kenny 1986; Namazi & Namazi 2016: 542). 
Corporate governance was employed as a moderating 
variable to determine the effect of the governance in each 
product lifecycle of the firm and identify the strength 
and the direction of the relationship between the firm’s 
product life cycling and its risk. Corporate governance 
includes several features and these features separately can 
be examined through a partial analysis.
 In order to measure corporate governance, various 
indices have been devised in other countries. For instance, 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), by focusing on 
the external role of corporate governance, devised a 
summary index for measuring corporate governance, 
known as G-index, based on the 24 pertinent provisions 
of the firm. Brown and Caylor (2006) introduced a Gov-
Score according to 51 internal and external measures 
of the corporate governance for each firm. Brown and 
Caylor (2006) and Jiang, Lee and Anandarajan (2008), 
among others, provide various advantages of using 
multidimensional-indices which adopt internal and 
external firm-specific measures. They mention that the 
multidimensional-indices are broader in scope with respect 
to the measuring governance; cover more firms, and are 
more dynamic and more reflective of the recent changes 
in the corporate governance environment for using a 
multidimensional criterion of corporate governance. 
 In Iran, however, corporate governance indexing 
is a recent development. The TSE started to devise 
the corporate governance index for its companies in 
2014.Accounting research in this sphere (Mehrani & 
Safar Zadeh 2010; Namazi et al. 2013) is also a few. 
Nevertheless, by considering the literature of corporate 
governance indices, we concluded that, in this study, 
a combined multiple provisions index is required that 
would be compatible with Iran’s environment as well as 
the reflecting peculiarities of the firm’s product lifecycle. 
Hence, the internal and external provisions of the corporate 
governance were considered in five dimensions: 1) 
characteristics of the board of directors, 2) accounting 
and corporate governance mechanism, as the internal 
TABLE 2. Cash flow details
Cash flows from operating activities EBIT + depreciation – taxes
Cash flows from investing activities
Acquisition and disposal of the company’s long-term investments 
such as property, plant and equipment, investment in subsidiaries 
and associates and so on.
Cash flows from financing activities
The amount of cash received from issuing stock or debt-cash paid 
as dividends and re-acquisition of debt or stock
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dimensions, 3) auditing functions, 4) public disclosure 
and information assimilation, and 5) external affairs as 
external dimensions. Then, the 18-item measures shown 
in Table 2, adopted from Mehrani and Safar Zadeh (2010), 
were implemented because these were identified after 
an extensive investigation of the domestic and foreign 
literature. They also encompass various multi- internal and 
external provision factors on the corporate governance. 
They were selected among many factors and finalized by 
a group of highly pertinent experts (certified accountants, 
corporate managers, university professors for accounting 
and finance and doctorate students, capital market’s 
experts, and the CEOs of the TSE firms).
 In order to operationalize the selected 18-item 
multidimensional list, following Brown and Caylor (2006) 
and Cremers and Nair (2005). “Coding and accumulating 
methodology” was implemented. Hence, we coded each of 
the 18 factors, either 1 or 0, depending on the operational 
definition provided in Table 3. We summed a firm’s binary 
variables to determine each firm’s corporate governance 
measures between 0 and 1. Therefore, the maximum total 
points of the corporate governance of a firm could be 18. 
In this study, the points were added and later defaulted by 
18 for homogenization with other variables. Higher values 
suggest superior corporate governance. Table 3 presents 
these details.
Control Variables In this research, the following two 
control variables were also adopted because of their 
significance in the relationship between the firm’s life 
cycles and its risks: Return on Equity (ROE) and debt to 
equity.
 ROE = Net Income/Shareholder’s Equity.
 In various stages of a firm’s life lifecycle, a higher 
level of risk assets might be associated with higher profits, 
especially in favorable times. Higher levels of profits 
might be expended to seek new loans and investments in 
the next period. In contrast, excessive high risks might 
lead to issues with loans and lower profitability that will 
eventually imply fewer risk assets in the next period (Delis 
& Kouretas 2011).
 Debt to Equity = Total Debt/Total Equity.
 In the various stages, the debt-to-equity ratio remains 
as a component of the leverage measure. However, it will 
additionally be included on its own since it is one of the 
most common measures of financial risk. Managers tend 
to have incentives for both to invest in riskier assets and 
to implement more aggressive debt policies (Close et al. 
2006).
MODELS
The following regression models were used to test the 
research hypotheses:
 RT = α0 + α1 Introduction + α2 Growth + 
   α3 Mature + α4 Shakeout + α5 Decline + 
   α6 ROE + α7DE + ε (1)
 RT = α0 + α1 CG + α2 Introduction + α3 Growth 
   + α4 Maturity + α5 Shakeout + α6 Decline 
   + α7 CG * Introduction + α8 CG * Growth 
   + α9 CG * Maturity + α10 CG * Shakeout 
   + α11 CG * Decline + α12 ROE + α13DE 
   + ε (2)
Where,
RT: Risk-taking, Introduction, Growth, Maturity, 
Shakeout, Decline: Components of the firm lifecycle, CG: 
Corporate governance. 
FINDINGS
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the research 
variables. 
 Table 3 shows that the means (medians) of risk-taking 
and corporate governance are 0.073 (0.052) and 0.376 
(0.4), respectively. As Table 3 shows, the mean score of 
each stage of the firm is different. Most of the firms are 
in the growth stage (with a mean of 0.4) and the lowest 
firms are at the decline stage (with a mean of 0.105). 
Results of the risk-taking variable show that the selected 
firms do not take much risk. In addition, the mean of 
corporate governance is low (0.376), which means that 
these firms do not maintain a high standard of corporate 
governance. Regarding the dispersion of the variables, 
Table3 also reveals that risk-taking ranges from 0 to 1.52, 
with a standard deviation of 0.099. Corporate governance 
ranges from 0.11 to 0.61 with a standard deviation of 0.99. 
Risk information of each stages of product lifecycle is also 
presented in Table 3.
 The number of selected firms for each year of the span 
of the study (2006-2014) was 128, which is equal to 11% 
of the total number of firms.
INFERENTIAL STATISTICS
In order to examine the relationship between the stages 
of the firms’ lifecycle and its risk-taking, the Spearman 
correlation analysis was employed and α = 5% was 
chosen for testing the significance level. Table 4 indicates 
the result of the correlation between the variables. As 
shown in Table 4, risk-taking is only negatively and 
significantly correlated with G (growth), and positively 
and significantly correlated with S (shake- out). Corporate 
governance is only negatively and significantly correlated 
with M (mature) and positively and significantly correlated 
with S (shake-out) of the stages of a firm’s lifecycle. The 
association between corporate governance and the size of 
the firm is also negative and significant. 
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TABLE 3. The checklist of the indices of corporate governance 
No. Item Operational definition
A.  Internal Provisions 
1. Characteristics 
of the board of 
directors
1 Use of non-executive members on 
the board
If the ratio of the specific firm (the proportion of the 
independent nonexecutive directors to the total number of 
directors) is greater than the mean ratio of the total firms, a 
value of 1 is assigned; otherwise 0 is assigned.
2 Separation of the roles of the CEOs 
and the chairman of the board
If the chief executive officer is also the chairman of the 
board, a value of 1 is assigned; otherwise 0 is assigned.
3 Stability of the CEOs For change of the executive in two prior years, 1 is assigned; 
otherwise 0 is assigned.
4 Concentration of the ownership If the percentage of free float shares of the firm is higher than 
the mean of free float shares of the total firm, 1 is assigned; 
otherwise 0 is assigned.
2.  Mechanisms 
of accounting 
and corporate 
governance 
5 Presence of the internal audit unit If the firm has internal audit unit, 1 is assigned; otherwise 
0 is assigned.
6 Related party transactions If the related party transactions to a firm, are less than the 
mean of the total firms, 1 is assigned; otherwise 0 is assigned.
7 Annual adjustments of the financial 
statements
For absence of annual adjustments 1 is assigned; otherwise 
0 is assigned.
B.  External 
provisions 
1.  Auditing functions
8 Rotation of the audit partners For rotation in two prior years, 1 is assigned; otherwise 0 
is assigned.
9 Audit size If the audit income is greater than the mean of the member 
of the Iranian Society of Certified Public Accountants audit 
firms, 1 is assigned; otherwise 0 is assigned.
10 Specialization of the auditor in the 
industry
If the auditor is specialized, 1 is assigned; otherwise 0 is 
assigned.
11 Opinion of the auditor For the unqualified opinion, 1 is assigned; otherwise 0.
2.  Public disclosure 
and information 
assimilation
12 Presence of a website For presence of a website, 1 is assigned; otherwise 0 is 
assigned.
13 Timing of the provision of 
information.
If the rating of the updates is greater than 50, the value of 
1 is assigned; otherwise 0 is assigned.
3.  External variables 14 The use of financial and accounting 
experts
For using an expert for the firm, 1 is assigned; otherwise 
0 is assigned.
15 The use of services of specialized 
consulting
For using consulting services, 1 is assigned; otherwise 0 
is assigned.
16 Presence of the rights of the 
shareholders to control
If the shareholders of the firm maintain the right, 1 is 
assigned; otherwise 0 is assigned.
17 Types of the ownership: Owned or 
state shareholders
If the public ownership of the firm is greater than the mean 
of the total firms, 1 is assigned; otherwise 0 is assigned.
18 Presence of a legal case against the 
company
For absence of legal case against the company in three prior 
years, 1 is assigned; otherwise 0 is assigned.
TABLE 4. Descriptive statistics of the firms (2006-2014)
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum  Std. Dev.
Risk-taking
Corporate governance
Introduction
Growth
Maturity
Decline
Shake-out
0.073
0.376
0.227
0.4
0.341
0.105
0.169
0.052
0.4
0
0
0
0
0
1.152
0.61
1
1
1
1
1
0
0.11
0
0
0
0
0
0.099
0.099
0.419
0.474
0.474
0.307
0.375
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 The Spearman correlations between the risk- taking 
of the firm and its corporate governance, mature firms, 
shake-out firms, and the size of the firms are positive. 
However, a significant relationship exists only among 
risk- taking, mature firms, and shake-out firms. The only 
positive correlation between corporate governance and 
the other variables is related to the shake-out stage of the 
firms. On the other hand, another significant relationship 
exists among corporate governance, mature firms, shake-
out firms, and the size of the firms. 
Testing the Effect of Product Lifecycle and Risk Although 
there is no statistically significant relationship between the 
introduction, mature, and decline stages and the risk- taking 
of the firms, they were included in the regression model 
as they are the components of firms’ lifecycles. Hence, 
to test the hypothesis of the study, all the stages of the 
lifecycle were examined to determine the effect of each 
stage according to the theory of lifecycle management. 
However, prior to a running related regression model, its 
assumptions were checked. First, the reliability position 
of the variables was examined. Based on the unit root test 
of Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), if the test result statistic is 
significant and less than 0.05, the independent, dependent, 
and control variables in the study are valid. The results of 
the reliability of the test variables are presented in Table 5. 
 Table 5 shows that, for all the independent, dependent, 
and control variables, the unit root test of Levin et al. (2002) 
is significantly smaller than 0.05, which shows that the 
variables are stationary. This implies that the mean variance 
and covariance of the variables of the study is constant over 
time and between different the variables. As a result, the 
examined companies do not experience structural changes 
of these variables in the regression model.
 In order to attain the objective of the study, an 
estimation of the pertaining research model was made 
via the Panel Data Method for each stages of the firm’s 
product lifecycle instead of the running a single regression 
model for the whole product lifecycles of the firms. In this 
method, it is necessary to carry out appropriate tests to 
estimate the efficiency of a regression model. Hence, first 
to decide which one of the common, fixed or random effects 
models should be selected, the regressions were applied. 
Then, the F-Limer test was used to choose between the 
no-effect and the fixed-effect model and the Hausman test 
was applied in each stages of the product lifecycle to find 
out whether to choose a fixed or a random effects model. 
Table 6 demonstrates the results of the test.
 According to the results in Table 6, the fixed effects 
method should be used for all the stages of the product 
lifecycle to perform the regression analysis.
 In order to test the auto regression (AR) assumption 
(the assumption of the independence of the residuals in a 
different period) of the multiple regression analysis, the 
Durbin-Watson test was performed at each stages of the 
product lifecycle since the stages were to be considered 
TABLE 4. Results of the spearman correlation analysis
RT CG I G M D S Size ROE
RT
CG
I
G
M
D
S
DE
ROE
1 0.056
1
-0.24
-0.208
1
-0.042*
-0.193
-0.38
1
0.081
-0.01*
0.018*
-0.079
1
-0.068
-0.095
-0.182
0.183
0.004*
1
0.029*
0.006*
-0.0388
-0.003*
0
-0.043*
1
0.193
-0.003*
0.998
-0.374
0.001*
-0.18
0.096
1
0.696
-0.182
0.995
0.972
-0.083
0.133
0.021*
0.001*
1
Note: Significant at: *5 percent levels
TABLE 5. Results of the unit root test
Variables Statistic p-value*
Risk- taking
Introduction
Growth
Maturity
Decline
Shake-out
Corporate Governance
ROE
Debt-Equity
-20.649
-4.813
-8.351
-5.206
-2.097
-2.057
-9.305
-8.222
-9.512
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00 
Note:* Significant at: 5 percent levels
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independently. Table 7 reveals the Durbin-Watson statistics 
of the model, indicating that the regression model does not 
exhibit any problem in this regard. The R2 of the model 
for each stage of the lifecycle illustrates the power of 
each stage. While the amount of R2 of all the five stages 
is close to each other, the amount of power of the firms 
at the decline stage (0.296), in relation to the risks of the 
firms, is the highest among various stages. This finding 
unequivocally indicates that the firms at the decline stage 
could explain 29.6% of the variations of the firm’s risks. 
 The results of the regression analysis of the first 
hypothesis also shows that only the effect of the decline 
stage (with a p-value of 0.0015) is significant and positively 
(with the coefficient of 0.038) related to the firm’s risk-
taking behavior. Table 7 also reveals that the coefficients of 
the introduction, growth, and mature and shake-out stages 
are 0. 012, -0.005, -0.01 and -0.004, respectively. The 
results in Table 7 also indicate that the introduction, growth, 
mature and shake-out stages do not posit a significant effect 
on the firm’s risk-taking variable. The significant control 
variables in each product lifecycle are also presented in 
Table 7. According to the provided information, the ROE 
is positively significant at all the five stages of the product 
lifecycle of the firms, whereas debt equity is only positively 
significant (P = 0.004*) at the introduction stage.
Testing the Effect of Corporate Governance The result 
for the second hypothesis is shown in Table 8 for the 
situation in which corporate governance is used as a 
moderating variable in the relationship among the stages 
of a firm’s product lifecycle and its risk-taking. This table 
indicates that corporate governance changes throughout 
the lifecycle. In fact, none of the stages of the firm’s 
lifecycle are significant when considered individually. 
However, at the 5% confidence level, when the interaction 
effects of the corporate governance at each stages of the 
product lifecycle are considered, there is a significant and 
negative effect (P = 0.0398*, coefficient = -0.133385) 
on the interaction among the growth stage and corporate 
governance, and the firm’s risk- taking. Whereas, there is 
a positive and significant effect (P = 0.0254*, coefficient 
= 0.272835) on the interaction on the decline stage and 
corporate governance, and the firm’s risk-taking. This 
means that when the firm is in the growth or the decline 
stage, corporate governance posits a significant effect on 
the company’s position that would lead to a decrease or 
TABLE 7. Regression analysis of the first hypothesis
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. Adjusted R2 Durbin-Watson•
Introduction
ROE
Debt-Equity
0.012863
0.0509
0.07
1.702815
1.038
1.762
0.0889
0.000*
0.004*
0.293990 1.605273
Growth
ROE
Debt-Equity
-0.005668
0.0027
0.001
-0.898195
0.352
2.022
0.3693
0.0072*
0.7247
0.292670 1.604540
Maturity
ROE
Debt-Equity
-0.010949
0.0728
0.0731
-1.739804
1.594
3.4
0.0822
0.0201*
0.4
0.293375 1.601334
Decline
ROE
Debt-Equity
0.038332
0.0769
-0.0542
3.175837
1.424
-1.074
0.0015*
0.04*
0.134
0.296513 1.616795
Shake-out
ROE
Debt-Equity
-0.004825
0.0745
-0.0058
-0.572641
2.169
-1.359
0.5670
0.001*
0.3652
0.292765 1.606543
• with considering AR (1)
Note: Significant at: *5percent levels
Dependent variable is Risk-taking
TABLE 6. Result of the F-Limer, Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests
Fixed effects test Hausman test Breusch-Pagan test
Variables Statistic Statistic Statistic
Introduction
Growth
Maturity
Decline
Shake-out
0.42568
0.534546
0.620284
0.652314
0.579904
1.36985
2.931707
0.968885
2.086762
1.025445
10.42351
 10.54117
 10.32594
10.12460
 10.39200
Note: Significant at: *5 percent levels
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an increase in the firm’s risk-taking. Thus, the moderating 
effects of corporate governance would become prominent. 
In the first hypothesis, only the effect of the decline 
stage was positively significant. However, in the second 
hypothesis, the interaction effect of both the growth stage 
and the decline stage firms are significant. Whereas the 
interaction effect of the first stage affects the relationship 
as a negative factor and the latter one as a positive factor. 
This means that for the second hypothesis, there are 
two stages of a product lifecycles that can explain the 
variations of a firm’s risk-taking. Table 8 also reveals the 
information regarding control variables. It shows that the 
ROE is still positively significant for the interaction effect 
of the corporate governance and all stages of the firm’s 
product lifecycles. Debt-equity, however, is only negatively 
significant (P = 0.002*) for the interaction effect of the 
firm’s corporate governance and the introduction stage. 
Hence, corporate governance changed the sign of the effect 
of debt-equity at the introduction stage.
 As Table 8 shows, when corporate governance is 
considered as a moderating variable, the power of the 
model improves for each stages of the product lifecycle 
in comparison with the previous model used in the first 
hypothesis. For instance, the power of the decline stage in 
the previous model was 0.296513, however, when corporate 
governance is exerted in the model, the power increases 
to 0.302177. The same pattern is observed with respect to 
the power of the growth stage, showing an increase from. 
0.292670 to 0.300213. Hence, corporate governance would 
enhance the effect of the lifecycle and the firm’s risk-taking, 
particularly at the decline and growth stages.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The major objective of this article was to identify the effect 
of each stage of a firm’s product lifecycle on its risk- taking 
behavior, particularly when corporate governance plays 
a moderating role in the relation between the two. The 
TSE data was gathered for the period between 2006 and 
2014.The panel data was employed as well. The findings 
suggest that among the different stages of the product 
lifecycles of the firms listed on the TSE, the mere effect 
of the decline stage is positively significant, and the other 
stages of the lifecycle would not exhibit any significant 
relationship with a firms’ risk-taking behavior. However, 
when corporate governance is added to the model as a 
moderating variable, two life-cycle stages would become 
significant: the interaction with corporate governance at the 
decline stage and the interaction with corporate governance 
at the growth stage. While the first interaction affects 
the firm’s risk- taking positively, the second one posits a 
negative effect. In addition, when the moderating effects 
of corporate governance are considered, the power of the 
model is enhanced. The ROE is also positively significant 
for the effect of interaction with the corporate governance 
and all the stages of the firm’s product lifecycle. Debt-
equity, however, is only negatively significant for the effect 
of interaction with the firms’ corporate governance and the 
introduction stage. These findings reveal the significance 
of corporate governance, as a moderating variable, on a 
firm’s life-cycles.
 One possible reason, regarding our findings, might be 
related to the nature and characteristics of the growth and 
TABLE 8. Regression analysis of the second hypothesis
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. Adjusted R2 Durbin-Watson
Introduction
Introduction *CG
ROE
Debt-Equity
0.01249
0.2836
0.041
-0.067
1.6257
0.75421
3.51
-2.6
0.104
0.10421
0.005*
0.002*
0.31452 1.542681
Growth
Growth *CG
ROE
Debt-Equity
0.0447
-0.133385
0.075
0.052
1.7816
-2.057803
2.367
1.625
0.0751
0.0398*
0.0401*
0.1057
0.300213 1.602277
Mature
Mature *CG
ROE
Debt-Equity
-0.007
-0.010871
0.0318
-0.0403
-0.2749
-0.170795
1.518
-2.896
0.7834
0.8644
0.000*
0.06
0.295140 1.593005
Decline
Decline *CG
ROE
Debt-Equity
-0.072
0.272835
0.0192
-0.007
-1.4446
2.238603
1.291
-1.143
0.1148
0.0254*
0.001*
0.2534
0.302177 1.616517
Shake-out
Shake-out *CG
ROE
Debt-Equity
-0.0236
0.052259
0.0437
-0.173
-0.7496
0.639616
1.875
-2.862
0.4537
0.5226
0.0101*
0.0843
0.294985 1.595346
Note: Significant at: *5 percent levels
Dependent variable is Risk-taking
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decline stages. Dickinson (2011), Suberi, Hsu and Wyatt 
(2011) and Hasan, Hossain and Habib (2015) contend that 
at the growth stage, the firm’s condition is: CFO > 0, CFI 
< 0, and CFF > 0,while at the decline stage, the firm will 
maintain: CFO < 0, CFI > 0, and CFF≤ or ≥0..In both of these 
situations, maintaining an optimal amount of cash for each 
purpose, and balancing the required cash for operations 
,investment and financing is extremely crucial because the 
product life cycling are at the turning point at these stages, 
and, therefore, would affect the risks of the firm. At the 
growth stage, however, if rebalancing the CFO, CFI, and CFF 
is done efficiently, the risk of the normal operation of the 
firm will reduce since there is an additional investments 
and management-related narcissism concerning future 
operations of the firm. While, at the declining stage, an 
additional risk will be dovetailed to the normal operation 
of the firm because the sign of unfavorable conditions has 
already appeared, and, hence, a potential risk of bankruptcy 
has emerged with more clarity. 
 Another reason why our findings show that the other 
stages of the lifecycle do not exhibit any significant 
relationship with the firms’ risk-taking might be related to 
our definition and formulation of the risk-taking criterion. 
The risk-taking model in this study was only related to 
the parameters of cash flows. According to Born, Payne, 
Scholar, Lin and Wen (2014), cash flows can be generated 
through underwriting activities, financing and investing 
choices, and even managing risks. It might not be sufficient 
to disclose significant risks of all the stages of the lifecycle.
A company with a higher level of corporate governance 
is linked to lower firm risk. Managerial risk-taking 
would have important implications for a firm’s growth, 
performance, and survival (Bromiley 1991). The results of 
this study showed that risk-taking is significant and higher 
at the decline stage of the firm’s life cycle. This result is 
consistent with the study of Habib and Hasan (2015). 
According to Habib and Hasan (2015), once a firm moves 
into the decline stage, the managers are likely to assume 
more risk in an attempt to return to profitability as the 
declining sales during this phase generates negative returns.
Our results concerning the role of corporate governance is 
also consistent with the study done by Filatotchev et al.’s 
(2006), which points out that corporate governance does 
indeed change along with the firm’s life-cycle. It is also in 
compliance with the work of O’Connor and Byrne (2015), 
who report that young, fast-growing firms are likely to 
establish desirable corporate governance practices to attract 
external financing, increase profitability, and, therefore, 
create value for the firm. 
 One of the reasons firms are likely to have very 
different governance needs at any one point in time is 
because these firms are likely to be at different stages 
in their lifecycles. In turn, firms at different stages of 
lifecycles are likely to discern different governance needs, 
since the wealth creation and protection functions of 
corporate governance change as the firm matures.
 Previous literature (Adams, Almeida & Ferreira 2005; 
Saravia 2013) also finds that young, fast-growing firms are 
likely to establish suitable corporate governance practices 
to attract external finance, increase profitability, and, 
therefore, create value for the firm. Our findings suggest 
that the quality of corporate governance achieves greatness 
when the firms are at the growth and decline stages. This 
finding is in accordance with the firm’s life cycle theory 
(Adams et al. 2005; Saravia 2013).
 Based on the findings of this study, it is suggested 
that managements, stockholders, stock market officials 
and actors, and security analysts should pay attention to 
the importance of corporate governance in their operations 
at each stages of a firm’s lifecycle. This attention is 
particularly vital for firms that are at the growth or decline 
stages because these significantly affect the firm’s policies, 
investments, cash flows, and profitability. 
 It is also suggested that managements and organizations 
concerned attempt to establish a “risk committee” within 
the firms, and try to improve the quality of risk information 
and provide transparent information about the products and 
their lifecycles. 
 Future researchers can also work on the type of 
investment decisions required at each stage of the firm’s 
lifecycle. Investment influences a firm’s risk-taking 
behavior and its lifecycle. Further research on the 
relationship of capital expenditures and bankruptcy with 
risk-taking is particularly suggested. 
 The result of this study is confined to the information 
obtained from the TSE market and Iran‘s corporate 
governance criteria. It is suggested that future studies 
extend the results of this research to other developing 
and developed markets to explore whether there is any 
significant differences between the markets and the role 
of corporate governance in this regard.
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